International Journal of Computer Science and Informatics


Routing is the one of the essential criteria at network level in mobile ad hoc networks. Ad hoc network routing protocols are difficult to design, and secure because unable to handle rapid node mobility and network topology changes. It has been realized by many researchers, and several “secure” routing protocols have been proposed for ad hoc networks. However, the security of those protocols has mainly been analyzed by informal means only. In this paper, we argue that flaws in ad hoc routing protocols can be very subtle, and we advocate a more systematic way of analysis. This approach is based on the simulation paradigm, which has already been used extensively for the analysis of key establishment protocols, but to the best of our knowledge, it has not. A new ondemand source routing protocol, called endairA, and demonstrate the usage of our framework by proving security. It is analyzed and shown that the security proof for the route discovery algorithm, endairA is flawed due to hidden channel attack. To overcome this flaw of EndairA algorithm, we uses acknowledgement based reply to find a secured route which provides more security and overcomes the hidden channel attack in the existing approaches.





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